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Local Government Pension Scheme Tobacco Industry Investments – 
Opportunities for Divestment 
 
 
Summary 
This paper explores the policy and legal background to the contested issue of 
tobacco investments by local authority pension funds, taking into account legal 
opinion and commentary, case law, public policy and new research (in preparation 
for publication) by the authors examining pension committee reports. In addition it 
examines the potential impact of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control on 
the long-term prospects of tobacco company investments, and how this has been 
considered in jurisdictions outside the UK when addressing the divestment issue.  
The paper concludes with policy options for consideration together with an appendix 
that considers some of the commonly raised barriers to divestment. A late addendum 
to this paper is included in response to a legal opinion that was issued around the 
time this paper was being finalised. 
 
1.0 Background 
Nearly all local authority (LA) pension funds invest in tobacco companies, the 
majority holding shares in transnational tobacco corporations (TTC) ),  namely British 
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American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco Group, Japan Tobacco International and Philip 
Morris.  In 2012 these direct investments were estimated to be valued at £1.7 billion, 
comprising 1.2% (range 0-3%) of aggregate fund valuations.  When LAs in England 
acquired new public health duties in April 2013, and became responsible for 
reducing smoking and leading on tobacco control, they were faced with a dilemma.  
Smoking is by far the largest cause of preventable premature death in England, and 
the largest single factor driving health inequalities.  There was a claimed 
contradiction between this new public health role on the one hand, and pension fund 
investment policies on the other.  
 
2.0 Statutory Governance of the Local Government Pension Scheme 
At this time the Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS) was in the midst of 
reform itself as a consequence of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, which saw 
the creation of a new body, the LGPS Advisory Board.  This Board has both a 
proactive and reactive role, and seeks to encourage best practice, increase 
transparency and co-ordinate technical and standards issues on behalf of all local 
government pension funds in England.  The Board has responsibility for advising the 
Secretary of State on the desirability of changes to the scheme, and also to local 
pension fund boards on the effective and efficient administration of the scheme.  The 
Secretary of State also has powers to make regulations in relation to the LGPS as he 
considers appropriate giving guidance or direction. 
2.1 Legal opinions on the scope for divestment 
Such was the concern about tobacco investment within local government, that the 
Board commissioned a legal opinion from Nigel Giffin QC which was published in 
April 2014 to answer two questions: 
1. Does an LGPS administering authority owe a fiduciary duty and if so to whom is it 
owed? 
2. How should the wider functions, aims or objectives of the administering authority 
influence the discharge of its LGPS investment duties? 
Giffin advised that fiduciary duties (and public law duties) are owed both to scheme 
members and employers.  In relation to the second question he stated: 
“The administering authority’s power of investment must be exercised for 
investment purposes, and not for any wider purposes. Investment decisions 
must therefore be directed towards achieving a wide variety of suitable 
investments, and to what is best for the financial position of the fund 
(balancing risk and return in the normal way).   However, so long as that 
remains true, the precise choice of investment may be influenced by wider 
social, ethical or environmental considerations, so long as that does not risk 
material financial detriment to the fund.  In taking account of any such 
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considerations, the administering authority may not prefer its own particular 
interests to those of other scheme employers, and should not seek to impose 
its particular views where those would not be widely shared by scheme 
employers and members (nor may other scheme employers impose their 
views upon the administering authority).” 
Giffin’s comments reflect Harries v Church Commissioners (1992) which took the 
view that wider considerations (which could include public health implications of 
investment, although this was not specified in the case), such as public health 
policies, could be taken into account where to do so would not risk ‘significant 
financial detriment.’ In summarising Giffin’s advice, the Board stated on its website 
that: 
“an administering authority may choose to take into account the public 
health implications of tobacco investment but only if the result of such 
consideration is the replacement of these investments with assets 
producing a similar return.” 
In effect, the Board has left it to individual local authority pension committees to 
consider the matter. 
Since the publication of Giffin’s opinion, the Law Commission has also published its 
final report on fiduciary duties, which, although non-binding, constitutes a form of 
persuasive authority on the matter.  The Commission endorsed Giffin’s reliance on 
Harries in outlining administering authorities’ duties and provided additional guidance 
on the relevance of ethical, social and governance issues to administering 
authorities’ investment decisions. It concluded that pension fund trustees (which 
include administering authorities for this purpose1) have been too narrow in their 
understanding of fiduciary duties, often due to risk averse legal advice, and have 
unnecessarily restricted their consideration of ethical, social and governance issues. 
2.2 Financial and non-financial factors in decision making 
In particular, the Commission makes a distinction between financial and non-
financial factors, making it clear that trustees should always take into account 
financial factors. 
‘Financial factors are any factors which are relevant to trustees’ primary 
investment duty of balancing returns against risks. A non-financial factor is 
one motivated by other concerns, such as improving members’ quality of life 
or showing disapproval of certain industries.  The distinction between financial 
                                                             
1 LGPS administering authorities are not subject to the same duties as pension fund trustees. 
Administering authorities manage funds on the basis of specific statutory powers and duties, rather 
than the pensions legislation and general trust law. These differences have led to uncertainty about 
which investment factors authorities may take into account when investing. It is likely that rules 
similar to those that apply to trust-based schemes also apply to the LGPS.  
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and non-financial factors may be illustrated with an example. Withdrawing 
from tobacco because the risk of litigation makes it a bad long-term 
investment is based on a financial factor. Withdrawing from tobacco 
because it is wrong to be associated with a product which kills people is 
based on a non-financial factor.’  
 
In respect of non-financial factors, the Commission stated that these may be taken 
into account if two tests are met: ‘trustees should have good reason to think that 
scheme members would share the concern’; and ’the decision should not involve a 
risk of significant financial detriment to the fund.’ This essentially reiterates the views 
of Giffin and Harries, but only in relation to non-financial factors.  The opinion of the 
Law Commission is clearly that ethical, social and governance factors may amount 
to financial factors that should be taken into account.  
 
2.3 Risk, return and past performance 
 
The difficulty with such formulations as ‘significant financial detriment’ is that it is 
impossible to predict future financial returns from particular stocks. As the 
Commission notes: 
 
‘Trustees are required to balance returns against risk. This is not a question of 
maximising returns: risks matter just as much as returns. Not all risks can be 
quantified. They often involve questions of judgement, which must be 
assessed at the time of the decision, not in hindsight.’ 
 
Local authority pension committee chairs are often quoted in the media as stating 
that they have a duty to maximise returns.  The Commission’s observations indicate 
that such a narrow interpretation of their fiduciary duties is incorrect.  Furthermore, 
the Commission states that decisions on investments are matters of judgement that 
cannot be reduced to numbers alone and, following the Kay Review of UK Equity 
Markets and Long-Term Decision Making, reaffirmed that past performance is 
“virtually no guide to future performance.”, This observation reinforces the point that 
the future performance of any particular stock or sector is unpredictable, and calls 
into question approaches which seek to use past performance of tobacco companies 
as reliable predictors of future performance, an approach commonly observed in 
reports to pension committees. 
On the method to be used in arriving at an appropriate mix of investments that 
balance risk and return, the Law Commission offers further guidance: 
 ‘When investing in equities over the long-term, the risks will include risks to 
the long-term sustainability of a company’s performance. These may arise 
from a wide range of factors, including poor governance or environmental 
degradation, or the risks to a company’s reputation arising from the way it 
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treats its customers, suppliers or employees. A company with a poor safety 
record, or which makes defective products, or which indulges in sharp 
practices also faces possible risks of legal or regulatory action.  Where poor 
business ethics raise questions about a company’s long-term sustainability, 
we would classify them as a financial factor which is relevant to risk’ 
Many of these factors apply to the tobacco industry, not least the risks of legal and 
regulatory action.  On how these factors should be integrated into investment 
decisions the Commission noted that the law ‘does not prescribe a particular 
approach’ and that ‘it is for trustees’ discretion, acting on proper advice, to evaluate 
which risks are material and how to take them into account.’ 
In summary, while the law is untested, it appears to be the case that ethical, social 
and governance issues should be taken into account by pensions committees 
where they constitute financial factors.  If, however, they are non-financial factors 
then they may only be taken into account if additional tests are met. 
 
3.0 Tobacco Control 
3.1 The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
In all of the foregoing, no consideration was given to the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control, a legally binding international public health treaty to which the UK 
is a signatory. 
 
The United Kingdom enters into obligations to the international community when it 
signs an international treaty. The terms of such Treaties and their associated 
guidelines to compliance can place requirements on the Parties to the treaty, 
including subsidiary levels of government, such as local authorities.  Guidelines are 
documents produced by the Parties to the Treaty to assist the Parties in achieving 
compliance with the Treaty obligations. The Guidelines to Article 5.3 apply to setting 
and implementing Parties’ public health policies with respect to tobacco control. They 
also apply to persons, bodies or entities that contribute to, or could contribute to, the 
formulation, implementation, administration or enforcement of those policies.  A 
recent legal opinion commissioned by the Trading Standards Institute from Richard 
Roberts QC, indicates that by virtue of the fact that the FCTC has been adopted by 
the EU it is likely that public authorities in this country are bound to comply with it.  
Domestic legislation is not required in these circumstances. 
 
While the Guidelines are not binding, the opinion notes that they are likely to be 
taken into account by a court in deciding whether Parties are in compliance with the 
Treaty and in particular Article 5.3 and that, in practice, public officials should only 
depart from them having given careful consideration to the consequences and 
documented their reasons for doing so.  The Article 5.3 Guidelines recommend that 
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no branch of Government, including local government, should have any financial 
interest or investment in the tobacco industry. 
 
 
3.2 The Potential Impact of the FCTC on Tobacco Company Earnings 
 
The objective of the FCTC is to enable the international community to protect 
present and future generations from the health social environmental and economic 
consequences of tobacco and to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence 
of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke. 
 
As a signatory to the FCTC the UK has committed “to reduce continually and 
substantially the prevalence of tobacco use.”  That public policy objective, which has 
cross-party support, is directly contradicted by UK public sector investments in 
tobacco companies, such as through the LGPS, as the tobacco companies work to 
undermine tobacco control policy, and seek to block or delay tobacco control 
measures, both domestically and internationally. In doing so, tobacco companies are 
acting in the best financial interests of their shareholders and ultimate owners, 
including LGPS funds, to maximise shareholder returns.    
 
 
3.3 Domestic tobacco control policy 
 
The English national tobacco control plan aims to reduce smoking prevalence, in line 
with the FCTC commitment and specifically to cut the number of smokers by 
210,000 every year. There has been substantial investment in smoking cessation by 
the NHS, a service that is now commissioned by local authorities. Government has 
also invested heavily in mass media campaigns, to both reduce uptake and 
encourage cessation.  These measures, combined with other evidenced based 
policies in place including taxing tobacco products, restrictions on marketing and 
smoking in public places, are expected over time to reduce the number of smokers in 
the UK.  Indeed, declining smoking rates in the UK are testament to its effective 
tobacco control measures, independently recognised as the most effective policies in 
Europe. 
 
It is considered likely that following the forthcoming general election there will be 
moves to set policy for the so-called ‘end game’ for smoking, seeking a reduction in 
smoking prevalence to below 5% (from the current 20%), a step already taken by 
some other jurisdictions such as New Zealand.  The direction of travel was made 
clear by the former Secretary of State for Health Andrew Lansley when he said in 
2012, "We are trying to arrive at a point where they (tobacco companies) have no 
business in this country."    
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3.4 International tobacco control policy response to the FCTC 
 
Importantly, similar measures are being adopted in numerous jurisdictions around 
the world, including countries where TTCs have hitherto encountered little regulation 
such as Russia and India.  Sales volumes have fallen in recent years and continue to 
do so in most major markets. Measures to restrict marketing and advertising, 
including standardised packaging, are expected to reduce the ability of companies to 
charge premium prices.   Furthermore, tobacco control policy learning appears to be 
accelerating; with, for example, standardised packaging of tobacco now on the 
agenda in many important markets having been successfully introduced in Australia. 
The proposal for a tobacco industry levy in the UK, if successfully introduced, may 
also be taken up in other relatively high tax jurisdictions further reducing tobacco 
company earnings where monopoly like profits may otherwise accrue, due to limited 
competition and the ability to mask significant before tax price increases on high end 
products.  
 
3.5 Implications of tobacco control for pension funds 
 
Local authority pension funds are required to set down in the statement of 
investment principles the extent, if at all, to which ethical, social and governance 
considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and realisation of 
investments.  Following the guidance of the Law Commission, administering 
authorities’ Statements of Investment Principles should be redrafted to take account 
of the fact that ethical, social and governance considerations must be taken into 
account where they are considered to have a financial impact.  Hitherto, many LGPS 
funds have decided not to consider these matters at all.  
 
The cumulative effect on tobacco industry returns of measures introduced in 
accordance with the FCTC is likely to constitute a financial factor.  Furthermore, 
there is growing evidence of the tobacco industry’s recent involvement in the illicit 
tobacco trade, including one TTC recently being heavily fined coming on top of 
overwhelming evidence of historical involvement in this illegal trade. This 
involvement presents new litigation risks in addition to continuing and future lawsuits 
in many jurisdictions. As a consequence, administering authorities should be 
considering whether or not to continue to hold tobacco investments. Furthermore, 
pension funds which have considered whether or not to divest from tobacco 
companies that did not consider the implications of the FCTC and the national 
tobacco control plan on the future financial performance of tobacco stocks should 
revisit those decisions. 
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4.0 Tobacco industry divestment in action 
 
Individual consideration of the above issues by administering authorities at the local 
level arguably constitutes a poor use of public funds.  The powers of the Advisory 
Board and Secretary of State allow them to be considered more efficiently at the 
national level, as has occurred in New Zealand and Norway, which warrant further 
examination. 
 
The New Zealand (NZ) Superannuation Fund Guardians decided in 2007 to divest 
from tobacco stocks following a detailed review.  The Fund has a responsible 
investment policy and is also charged with: 
 
 Best practice portfolio management 
 Maximising return without undue risk to the Fund as a whole 
 Avoiding prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of 
the world community 
 
Provided there is no conflict with the matters listed above, the Guardians may also 
consider other matters including whether the issue is contrary to  
New Zealand law and international agreements the New Zealand Government is 
party to or is inconsistent with Crown actions. 
 
Following a review the Guardians concluded that investment in tobacco stocks was 
not inconsistent with best-practice portfolio management or maximising returns 
without undue risk, but neither was divestment and exclusion of tobacco stocks.  
They also concluded that there was only a small risk that New Zealand’s reputation 
would be damaged by continued investment in tobacco stocks. However, in 
considering the regulatory environment, the Guardians considered continued 
investment to be inconsistent with the NZ governments FCTC commitments, and in 
addition, that actions arising from the FCTC obligations may have a material 
negative impact on the long-term growth and profitability of the tobacco 
industry, and therefore runs counter to the aims of the industry and its shareholders.  
Furthermore, investment was also regarded as inconsistent with major government 
actions, including the national plan for tobacco control. 
 
In Norway, the Pension Fund Global (the world’s largest pension fund by value) was 
advised in 2009 by the Council of Ethics, an official advisory body, to divest from 
tobacco, on ethical rather than financial grounds.  The reasons stated for the change 
were the advent of the FCTC and a tightening of Norway’s own laws on tobacco.  
The Minister of Finance at the time was quoted as saying that ‘It is important that the 
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ethical guidelines reflect at all times what can be considered to be commonly held 
values of the owners of the Fund’, namely the people of Norway. 
 
 
4.1 Constructive engagement 
 
Even when such concerns are accepted, divestment is not usually the preferred 
response. The possibility of engaging with the companies, rather than divesting, is 
usual practice under the UN Principles for Responsible Investment initiative.  In New 
Zealand, the crucial factor in the decision to divest was that engagement would have 
very limited impact on product safety, which is the core issue, given that 1 in 2 long 
term smokers is killed by smoking and that knowledge of the health harms of 
smoking since the 1950s has led to very little change in product safety.  The main 
aim of tobacco companies, and indirectly their shareholders, is to grow sales 
revenue from tobacco products, through expanding and renewing the customer 
base.  This was considered contrary to New Zealand’s national policy objectives 
under the FCTC which aim to significantly reduce the prevalence of tobacco use. 
 
 
4.2 Effect of divestment on fund performance 
 
The subsequent performance of both the NZ and Norwegian Funds underlines that 
divestment does not unduly affect portfolio growth. As table 1 shows, both funds 
have substantially outperformed UK LGPS Funds, including the West Yorkshire 
Fund which has the largest exposure to tobacco. 
 
Pension Fund Performance Table (% return to 2014)2 
 1 yr 5yr 
New Zealand Superfund 19.4 17.0 
Norway Global 15.9 12.0 
UK LA average 6.4 12.7 
Greater Manchester 7.0 12.7 
West Yorkshire 4.8 12.1 
East Riding 7.1 14.0 
North Yorkshire 12.0 Not stated3 
South Yorkshire 5.7 12.74 
Somerset 7.5 13.9 
Cornwall 4.6 11.0 
 
 
                                                             
2 Source: Annual reports of the individual funds 2013/14, except Norway calendar year 2013. 
3 North Yorkshire report states ranked first in LGPS funds but does not give figure. 
4 Estimated from bar chart. 
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4.3 The Role of the Advisory Board and Secretary of State 
 
 
The LGPS Advisory Board has not given consideration to the FCTC and its potential 
financial impact on tobacco investments, nor with the odd exception have individual 
pension funds.  The Law Commission’s report clearly implies that Funds should do 
so, therefore the question arises as to how this might be brought about.  There 
appear to be several ways this could be done and in which the Directors of Public 
Health could collectively play a role: 
 
Option 1. The Advisory Board might itself decide that it should address this issue.  
To do so, it could seek advice on the full range of issues outlined in this report, in a 
similar manner to the approach taken in New Zealand and Norway.  Such a review 
might be triggered by requests from individual local authorities, the Local 
Government Association, or the Association of Directors of Public Health (ADPH), 
citing the FCTC, both in general and with specific reference to Article 5.3 and the 
guidelines, and the fact that individual authorities have not, according to our 
research, taken account of the relevance of the FCTC to tobacco companies future 
financial performance.  The ADPH should ensure that it is able to give evidence to 
any such review on the potential impact of FCTC measures on the long-term 
prospects for tobacco stocks, as well as the public health and economic impacts of 
tobacco on the population. The Advisory Board might then reach the conclusion that 
tobacco investments are not a sound long-term investment for pension funds due to 
the implications of the FCTC and UK government policies, as was the case with 
those other jurisdictions, and advise the Secretary of State with a view to him issuing 
a Direction to divest to individual funds. 
 
Option 2. An alternative approach would be for the Secretary of State to formally 
request the Advisory Board to consider whether LGPS Funds should divest from 
tobacco stocks. The Secretary State’s justification for intervening covers  the 
potential financial implications of regulatory action arising from the FCTC, the 
decisions of similar Boards in New Zealand and Norway, UK Government tobacco 
control policy, and the relevance of Article 5.3 to local authorities continuing 
investment in tobacco stock.  In addition, he may highlight that LGPS investments in 
tobacco stocks undermine government policy by suggesting to the public that it is not 
fully committed to reducing smoking prevalence, and may undermine local authority 
tobacco control and smoking cessation programmes, and by implication undermine 
compliance with the aims of the FCTC. 
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Option 3.  A third option would be for the Secretary of State to make regulations in 
accordance with his powers under the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 which direct 
LGPS funds to divest tobacco stocks from their portfolios and exclude tobacco 
stocks from future investment. Such a direction would be made after consultation 
with relevant interested parties.  By investing in tobacco companies whose objective 
is to grow sales and increase smoking prevalence,  LGPS funds are effectively 
undermining the UK Government’s local, national and international public policy 
objectives to reduce tobacco use. 
 
Option 4. In the event that the Advisory Board and/or Secretary of State do not 
consider these questions, or do not recommend or direct divestment, a final 
alternative is for Directors of Public Health to seek  a change in the law  prohibiting 
LGPS pension funds (and other public sector bodies) from investing in tobacco 
companies.  Such a proposal for legislation or regulation might  be included in a new 
tobacco control plan arising after the general election.  
 
In addition to the above, there is a need for the Secretary of State to take steps 
aimed at strengthening the regulations and guidance on ethical, social and 
governance matters. At present the relevant regulations leave decisions on these 
matters to the discretion of individual pension funds.  Given the view of the Law 
Commission it would be appropriate for the Secretary of State to either amend 
regulation 12 of the 2009 Regulations, or to issue guidance under regulation 12(3) 
requiring funds to set out their policies in relation to financial and non-financial 
factors under regulation 12(2)(f).   
 
 
For Directors of Public Health seeking to address this issue at a local, rather than 
national level, the appendix may assist with addressing common objections and 
issues raised in previous committee reports to pension committees in England and 
Scotland. 
 
 
This briefing note was written by Stewart Brock, University of Bath, Gary Fooks, 
University of Aston, Anna B Gilmore, University of Bath Tobacco Control Research 
Group, and Rob Branston, University of Bath. 
 
The TCRG is a multidisciplinary group producing high quality academic research that 
evaluates the impact of public health policy on health, and the influence of major 
corporations on health behaviours, health outcomes, and policy.  
Funding statement: The production of this paper was funded by Smokefree 
Yorkshire and the Humber. 
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Key Points: 
1. Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS) funds should, in law, take 
account of ethical, social and governance matters, if those matters may 
materially affect the long-term financial performance of stocks, such as those 
of tobacco companies. 
2. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) commits the 
governments of 178 countries responsible for 90% of global population to 
“continually and substantially” reduce smoking prevalence. 
3. Other jurisdictions have determined that actions arising from 
implementation of the FCTC may have a material negative impact on the 
medium to-long-term growth and profitability of the tobacco industry.  The 
available evidence from New Zealand and Norway suggests that these 
divested funds have subsequently outperformed UK LGPS funds. 
4. LGPS funds are NOT required to maximise returns; they are required to 
balance risk and return across their portfolios. 
5. Not all investment risks can be quantified in mathematical terms. They often 
involve questions of judgement, which must be assessed at the time of the 
decision, not in hindsight.  Past performance should NOT be regarded as a 
guide to future performance. 
6. The FCTC is likely to be directly applicable to local authorities in the UK by 
virtue of the UK’s membership of the EU, and all the Guidelines for 
implementation are likely to have juridical significance.  The Guidelines to 
Article 5.3 of the FCTC recommend that local government should not have 
investments in tobacco companies. 
7. The LGPS Advisory Board should commission a review of tobacco industry 
investments having regard to wider public policy objectives including  
obligations under the FCTC, the FCTC’s financial effects on tobacco company 
earnings in the medium to long-term, and the reasons for divestment 
decisions in other jurisdictions. 
8. The Secretary of State (DCLG) has the power to make regulations directing 
that LGPS funds divest from tobacco stocks. 
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Addendum 
 
Policy Note for Smokefree Yorkshire and the Humber 
 
Local Government Pension Scheme Tobacco Industry Investments – 
Opportunities for Divestment 
 
As this policy note was being finalised, Suffolk County Council published on its 
website a new legal opinion commissioned from Nigel Giffin QC, specifically on the 
issue of tobacco divestment.  This opinion came too late to incorporate into the body 
of the report.  This addendum considers the significance of this new opinion. 
Giffin reiterates the advice he has previously given to the Local Government 
Association, which focuses in particular on whether or not there is likely to be 
significant or material financial loss arising from a divestment decision.  He refers to 
the advice received by the Suffolk Pension Committee from the investment 
managers retained by the Council.  They all consider that there would be at the least 
the potential for some material disadvantage to the pension fund.  Much store 
appears to be placed on past performance data, despite the acknowledgement that 
past performance is not a guide to future performance,   He goes on to conclude that 
this information is sufficient for the committee to decide against divestment, and 
goes further in concluding that divestment would be unlawful, based on the 
professional advice received. 
However, he also acknowledges several important issues in reaching that 
conclusion. In particular, he acknowledges that other councils have reached differing 
conclusions and that some of the authorities concerned may have acted on the basis 
of their opinion that tobacco will be a poor investment in the future (because of the 
risk of regulatory action or large scale litigation).  Giffin has not examined these 
decisions, but acknowledges that they may be legitimate as they were based on a 
judgement about long-term financial prospects, rather than ethical or social grounds.  
This is consistent with our own analysis, and in particular allows for the view that the 
risks from regulatory action arising from implementation of the FCTC are significant 
and should be taken into account.  Giffin himself does not address risk from the 
FCTC, but does acknowledge the need for a long term perspective. 
As the Law Commission noted decisions about future performance are not 
mathematical ones based on past performance, but judgements taking into account 
a range of material factors. It does not appear, for example, that Giffin has 
considered the fact that governments for 90% of the world population are committed 
to continually and substantially reducing smoking prevalence.  That fact alone might 
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lead a pensions committee to, at the very least, question the long term prospects for 
tobacco investments, and perhaps to conclude that remaining invested in tobacco 
risks significant financial detriment to the fund, in the long-, if not the short-term.   
Giffin acknowledges that “It is possible, at any rate in theory that different or 
additional factual information might point to a different conclusion. It is certainly open 
to the Council to seek further information, or informed investment advice, if it 
considers it appropriate to do so. However, the Council has in my opinion already 
done at least sufficient to discharge its obligation to take reasonable steps to inform 
itself properly before coming to a conclusion.” 
In taking advice only from its current investment managers and advisers, and in 
particular in failing to consider the implications of regulatory action arising from the 
FCTC on the long term prospects of tobacco companies, we would argue contrary to 
Giffin, that the Council is not properly informed about regulatory risk, and therefore 
has not taken sufficient steps to reach a conclusion. 
In conclusion, this new legal opinion does not, as it may at first appear, rule out 
divestment.  On the contrary it acknowledges that the council may seek additional 
advice, and that it might reach a different conclusion having done so.  This is 
consistent with our own analysis, which argues that local authorities have hitherto 
failed to consider the full implications of FCTC implementation in the long term. 
SB  
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Appendix   
 
Addressing barriers to divestment 
 
Analysis of reports to pension committees on divestment from tobacco stock by 
council officials has identified a number of commonly identified issues that are 
considered by those officials to be practical barriers to divestment, set out as 
problems below, with suggested responses. 
Where officers seek external advice, it is essential to ensure this advice is truly 
independent and not produced by firms with links to the tobacco companies. 
 
1. The Slippery Slope 
 
Problem: 
The question is often raised of “what next” if we divest from tobacco.  It has been 
suggested for example that Directors of Public Health will seek further divestments 
regarding alcohol, fast food, gambling etc.  Similarly, pressure groups often seek 
divestment from companies which are of concern to them such as fossil fuels in 
relation to climate change, or arms companies. Pension committees cannot possibly 
consider all divestment requests made on ethical, social and governance grounds. 
 
Response: 
Tobacco is a uniquely hazardous consumer product killing half of its longterm users.  
Unlike alcohol, fast food and gambling, there is no safe level of smoking. This unique 
status is the reason we have the FCTC. This global regulatory infrastructure is likely 
to have financial implications for tobacco investments.  No such measures exist in 
relation to the other product classes mentioned.  
 
There are very few investments where international Treaties to which the UK is a 
signatory are relevant.  Other than the FCTC, there are several arms control treaties 
which ban certain weapons systems, such as cluster munitions and anti-personnel 
mines.  
 
For these banned weapons, and for fast food, alcohol, etc, constructive engagement 
with the companies concerned may be an appropriate response to ethical concerns.  
For example several companies that manufactured cluster bombs or parts for them, 
decided to withdraw from that market in response to investor concerns.   
 
Constructive engagement with tobacco companies regarding corporate social 
responsibility is not an appropriate response as it is the fundamental safety of the 
product that is at issue and there is no evidence that such engagement has ever 
achieved positive outcomes.     
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Pension committees may wish to use the existence of international treaties to which 
the UK is a signatory as a guide or ‘line in the sand’, on what investments they will 
consider for divestment.   
 
It is also worth noting that in a Consultation Paper the Law Commission stated that, 
‘Trustees should not invest in activities which contravene international conventions’ 
(para 14.25), citing the Convention on Cluster Munitions.  The Local Authority 
Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) agreed with this position. However, in its final report, 
under challenge, the Law Commission accepted that investment in foreign 
companies producing cluster munitions was not illegal in the UK and therefore 
stepped back from this position.  However, the implication here is that domestic law 
is out of step with the UK’s international commitments, and that in lobbying for 
tobacco divestment, it could be helpful to reference other international treaty 
obligations such as those covering cluster munitions.  Several EU countries have 
banned such investments in domestic law.  Should political lobbying on tobacco 
divestment be pursued there may be advantages in framing the issue, to some 
extent, around wider Treaty obligations than just the FCTC, but this will require 
deeper consideration. 
 
 
2. Performance measurement and pooled funds 
 
Problem: 
Fund managers’ performance is measured against benchmarks, relevant to their 
particular portfolio eg UK, World.  Their financial rewards may be linked to the 
performance of the stocks under their management relative to the benchmark.  
Excluding tobacco means the standard benchmark is no longer a reflection of the 
“investable universe” for the fund manager. Therefore bespoke benchmarks will 
need to be constructed which take account of the excluded stocks.  In addition, most 
LGPS funds have some or all of their tobacco investments held within pooled funds.  
These are financial products offered by fund managers which contain numerous 
separate company stocks.  LGPS funds cannot divest from the individual stocks, 
only the pooled fund itself. 
 
Response:  
Many fund managers are content, when asked, to be measured against existing 
benchmarks, as they do not see tobacco as a major factor in their performance. 
However, UK Index focused managers holding stocks in Imperial Tobacco and 
British American Tobacco, both FTSE100 companies, either directly or in UK 
focused pooled funds such as the FTSE100 tracker, are more likely to raise 
objections, as these two stocks comprise about 5% of the FTSE100 index by value.  
In contrast, tobacco is a much smaller proportion of world indexes. 
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Alternative benchmarks do exist.  For example, the MSCI ex tobacco and 
controversial weapons index excludes tobacco and controversial weapons systems, 
which might be considered suitable, depending on the degree of exposure of the 
fund manager to relevant arms companies.  Blackrock offers a fund that matches this 
index. 
 
If all UK LGPS Funds were to divest from tobacco, the cost of a bespoke index is 
likely to be minimal when spread across all funds.  The market may well respond to 
such a decision by creating an index, and indeed create pooled fund products that 
match current benchmark indices with the exclusion of tobacco. There are only a  
limited number of tobacco companies, which are well-defined, (with19 on the 
Norwegian government list).  A UK index benchmark would simply exclude the two 
FTSE100 companies. 
 
 
Fund managers making a switch from current pooled funds to new ex-tobacco funds 
are likely to incur some costs arising from fees for switching.  If a national level 
divestment decision is made, market forces in search of a share of around £2 billion 
of tobacco investments in segregated and pooled funds are likely to result in price 
competition to secure investments. Experience from overseas funds that have 
divested may be helpful in understanding cost implications of changing investments.  
 
It should also be noted that many overseas funds have divested from tobacco (and 
often controversial weapons systems too), so must be effectively measuring 
performance of fund managers to their satisfaction.  Advice could be sought from 
these pension funds.  
 
3. Risk of legal challenge 
 
Problem: 
Several pension committee reports express concern about the risk of legal 
challenge.  For example: 
 
“A challenge could come from (say) a council taxpayer because pension 
fund returns have suffered as a result of operating an exclusion policy. 
Also, a challenge could come from a council taxpayer who disagrees with 
the ethical judgment of the pension committee, and has his/her own 
(different) views of which investments should be excluded. 
(Northumberland)” 
 
Response:  
It is important to differentiate between the likelihood of a legal challenge, and the 
likelihood of a successful legal challenge. Many of the officer opinions predate the 
Law Commission report with its clear distinction between financial and non-financial 
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factors.  There is precedent from New Zealand that tobacco regulation is a financial 
factor, as the Board of Guardians determined that tobacco regulation arising from the 
FCTC and national policies may have a material negative impact on the long-term 
growth and profitability of the tobacco industry. 
 
After proper consideration of all material factors, including taking both professional 
financial advice, and advice on the likely long-term impact of the FCTC, a pension 
committee has the power to effectively agree with the view of the New Zealand 
Board and choose to divest.  Provided due process is followed and the issue is not 
pre-judged, then while a legal challenge cannot be ruled out, the apparent 
widespread perception within local authorities of a successful legal challenge 
appears overplayed.   
 
Furthermore, a legal challenge is unlikely to come from scheme members as 
beneficiaries’ pensions are based on defined benefits, so not in themselves 
dependent on fund investment performance.  Giffin also advised (prior to the Law 
Commission report) that it is unlikely that the administering authority would be liable 
for damages to other employers in the scheme for breach of duty of care by 
negligence. 
 
Finally, it is also important to note that concerns over legal challenges in committee 
reports is typically based on the risk of litigation arising from divestment. 
Interestingly, no consideration is given to risk of legal challenge arising from failure to 
consider relevant financial factors, such as regulatory risk arising from the FCTC, in 
considering whether or not to divest. This reflects the fact that few reports begin to 
broach the financial ramifications of the FCTC on tobacco stock. However, given that 
the bar for successful judicial review is set quite high, the likelihood of legal 
challenge at all is, in our view, minimal, provided due process is followed. 
 
4.  Past performance as a guide to the future 
 
The problem: 
It is common practice in reports by council officials providing guidance on divestment 
to pension fund committees to use calculations based on past performance to 
estimate the impact of divesting from tobacco.  This is reported historically, with 
actual performance over, say, the previous 5 years, compared with how that would 
have differed without tobacco stocks and with a presumption that future performance 
is likely to follow a similar pattern.  This approach, often reflecting advice provided by 
fund managers, structures decisions against divestment as the past performance of 
tobacco stock has proved quite strong and the stock itself has also suffered less 
volatility than the stock market average. 
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Response:  
The Law Commission, citing the Kay review, confirms that “Past performance is 
virtually no guide to future performance”.  The point is sometimes acknowledged in 
officers’ reports, which nevertheless go on to use past performance as a guide to 
decisions.  Tobacco volumes are declining in most major markets.  FCTC derived 
regulation is accelerating this process. DsPH should challenge the use of past 
performance as a guide to the future, and emphasise the increasing regulatory risks 
to profitability in the medium to long term. 90% of the world’s population is covered 
by the FCTC with 178 countries committed to reducing “continually and substantially” 
smoking prevalence.  The USA and Indonesia are the notable non-signatories, but 
due to strong domestic policies the USA is also seeing significant falls in smoking 
prevalence. 
